1) Introduction
illustrates how the cognitive sophistication needed by an organism to achieve its goal depends on the structure of the environment. In his terminology, the environment includes the institution defined as the set and the timing of actions that may be chosen by the agents. This idea is at the origin of Williamson's (1975) view concerning the emergence of diverse institutions when bounded rationality creates transaction costs: in some situations, markets economize on these transaction costs, while in others, hierarchies appear more efficient. This paper puts forward these points in an experimental market microstructure study. The objective is to document "the precise manner in which institutions serve as social tools that reinforce, even induce, individual rationality", Smith (1991) . Along this line, I will develop the point that market transparency, if it can sometimes modify equilibrium outcomes (see, for example, Pagano and Röell (1996) ), may also affect the ability of agents with bounded rationality to discover equilibrium strategies.
I study two uniform-price trading mechanisms under asymmetric information: the Walrasian Tâtonnement and the Call Market. In the context of experimental financial markets, I investigate the ability of traders to play equilibrium strategies and I assess the relative performance of the two trading mechanisms in inducing equilibrium discovery. An environment similar to Plott and Sunder (1982) is used to induce asymmetrically informed agents in the laboratory. The market institutions are compared in terms of price and allocative efficiencies. Observing the performances of diverse market structures in a well-controlled experimental setting enables one to analyze the influence of microstructure on the price formation process and on the discovery of equilibrium.
A theoretical analysis of the experimental setting shows that the same revealing and non-revealing Perfect Bayesian Equilibria exist in the two market structures. In the revealing equilibria, prices exhibit strong efficiency and all the gains from trade are exploited. This game theoretical foundation is independent of risk preferences and allows me to provide a clear-cut interpretation of the data.
I find that the informational efficiency observed in the experiment is almost perfect. This suggests that subjects coordinate on the revealing equilibrium in the Walrasian Tâtonnement as well as in the Call Market. Concerning the allocative performance of the two institutions, it appears that i) the surplus extraction is not perfect, and ii) more gains from trade are exploited under the Walrasian Tâtonnement than under the Call Market. In this latter market structure, traders do not manage to participate to the transactions as often as they should. These results suggest the following interpretations. First, some cognitive factors not yet included in the game-theoretic analysis prevent human subjects from discovering equilibrium strategies. Strategic uncertainty, judgement errors or computational limitations are consistent with the experimental data. Second, the Walrasian Tâtonnement which is an "explicit" mechanism in the sense that the execution price is known before a transaction occurs and that tentative prices may be observed, appears more adapted than the Call Market to the limited nature of human cognition. Depending on the origin of the deviations from equilibrium that one considers, the Walrasian Tâtonnement through its "explicit" characteristic may be viewed as a mechanism that i) aligns the expectations concerning traders' rationality, ii) is better adapted to heuristics people may use to form their judgement, or iii) generates more tractable mental representations.
The "explicit" nature of the Walrasian Tâtonnement is driven by its pre-trade transparency: along the trading process, agents can observe successive tentative prices and the associated excess demands. All this information is not available during the Call Market in which limit orders are privately submitted and aggregated to determine the market clearing price. At equilibrium, the opacity of the Call Market do not reduce its efficiency. Yet when populated with actual human beings, this latter market structure displays higher transaction costs. This paper is related to the design of financial markets. As it focuses on uniform-price market institutions, it is particularly well-suited to study the design of daily market openings. As information accumulate during the night, daily market openings experience a high volatility (Amihud and Mendelson (1991) ). In order to enhance the equilibrium price discovery, many stock exchanges have organized their opening as uniform-price mechanisms, some of them resembling the Walrasian Tâtonnement (e.g. the NYSE for a pre-opening period in a specialist system and the Paris Bourse for a pre-opening period in an electronic open order book). The influence of the market structure on price discovery has been the object of empirical studies such as Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1999) or Madhavan and Panchapagesan (2000) . The experimental methodology offers an appropriate tool to complement these earlier field studies and to assess in the laboratory the equilibration properties of the Walrasian Tâtonnement mechanism. Moreover, comparing the performance of this trading institution to the Call Market may provide some elements concerning the design of optimal trading mechanisms.
Several experiments have already analyzed uniform-price mechanisms. Only two previous studies by Joyce (1984) and Bronfman et al. (1996) deal with the Walrasian Tâtonnement trading mechanism.
They use a private value environment and study the performance of this trading mechanism in achieving the competitive equilibrium. The Call Market has also been the object of experimental investigations in a private value framework. Cason and Friedman (1999) compare the individual behavior to the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium bidding theoretical predictions on a Call Market. While their data support the basic implications of the theory, some deviations from the normative benchmark point at learning occurring during their experimental sessions. My analysis complements these articles offering a comparison of the two trading venues in a common value/asymmetric information environment. 5 The transparency issue is a recurrent theme in dealer market experiments. Bloomfield and O'Hara (1999) show that post-trade transparency improves the informational efficiency and widens the bid-ask spread. Flood et al. (1999) find that pre-trade transparency induces a herding behavior in quote settings that slows down the price discovery process. Finally, Cason (2000) shows that, when dealers are allowed to communicate privately between trading periods, they collude to widen spreads and earn greater profits. While these papers focus on market performances, I go a step beyond and also investigate individual rationality. My work is thus aligned with Lamoureux and Schnitzlein (1997) who show that subjects incur more losses when they trade in a fragmented rather than in a centralized market. In a quote-driven situation, find that the presence of an opening Call (or a preopening period followed by an opening Call) operating before a double auction market improves the ability of agents to discover equilibrium strategies with respect to a situation in which there is only a continuous trading period. I build on these findings considering different market structures in a situation where there are gains from trade, and providing new insights concerning the impact of microstructure on the discovery of equilibrium.
Our result that the Walrasian Tâtonnement and the Call Market do not display the identical properties predicted by the theory echoes the findings of Kagel, Harstad and Levin (1987) . They use an affiliated value environment and show that an English auction performs better than a second-price auction, contradicting their risk-neutral bidding theoretical benchmark. They put forward the potential risk aversion of the subjects to explain the observed deviations from equilibrium. My results cannot be interpreted in these terms since the equilibrium predictions that I derive do not depend on the preferences of the agents. On the other hand, my interpretation is in line with Camerer's (1999) conjecture that market structure may affect mental representations human beings rely on to make their decisions.
In the rest of this paper, the Walrasian Tâtonnement will be referred to as WT and the Call Market as CM. The following section presents the experimental design and the two market institutions under examination. The third section provides a game-theoretical analysis. Results and interpretations are presented in section 4. The final section offers some concluding remarks.
The proofs of the propositions are in appendix 2.
2) Experimental market design
I ran the experiment with 12 different cohorts of students from Toulouse University. Subjects were graduate student in economics, management or business administration. Each cohort included between 8 and 12 subjects. Each cohort participated to 10 replications of the experiment. The instructions for the WT experimental sessions are presented in appendix 1. For the CM sessions, the instructions are identical except for what concerns the trading process. During the experimental sessions, no communication among agents was allowed neither between nor within replications of the game. Each experimental session whether under the WT or the CM regime lasted 2 hours.
2.1) Environment and incentives
2.1.1) Asset value and information I use a mixed private and common value environment inspired by Plott and Sunder (1982) . Subjects can trade an asset whose common value V can be either • 2 or • 8 with the same probability, one half.
This common value element is drawn at the beginning of each replication of the trading game but is not publicly announced. It is only revealed at the end of the replication once transactions have already occurred.
In addition, a private value is publicly assigned (for the entire experimental session) to each subject: it is either +1 or -1. Thus the asset value for a "+1" subject can be either • 3 or • 9; the value for a "-1" subject can be either • 1 or • 7. Private values are common knowledge among players. On the market, the number of "+1" subjects is equal to the number of "-1" subjects. The number of subjects is thus an even number. One may think about this private value as emerging from differences in tax rates of investors. In this interpretation, "+1" subjects would enjoy a lower tax rate than "-1" subjects.
The structure of the asset's value creates explicit gains from trade, under symmetric information about V, between "+1" subjects on the buying side of the market and "-1" subjects on the selling side.
Private information is induced in the experimental market in the following way: at the beginning of each replication and before the trading period starts, half of the "+1" subjects and half of the "-1" subjects receive a perfect signal indicating whether the common value V is • 2 or • 8. Note that when there are 10 subjects per cohort, the number of "+1" and "-1" subjects is an odd number. In this case, the numbers of uninformed and informed agents are not identical. Every agent receives the signal five times per session. The distribution of signals and the private value component of each subject are presented in Table 1 .
2.1.2) Endowments, asset portfolio
Subjects start each replication with a monetary endowment of • 10 and no asset. Traders can buy or sell only one unit per replication. Short sales are allowed. At the end of each replication, final wealth are computed and are equal to the initial cash endowment plus the proceeds from sales minus the cost of purchases plus the value of their portfolio reflecting the common value V and their private component (+1 or -1). For instance, if a "-1" subject buys at a price equal to • 6 one unit of the asset whose common value is • 8, her final wealth is: 10-6+(8-1)=11.
Subjects did not receive explicit strong incentives as their earnings were not converted into cash or grade 1 . Nevertheless, after each replication, the final wealth of every subject was publicly announced and the best trader was congratulated. The timing of a session is displayed in Figure 1. 
2.1.3) Incentives
After each replication, the final wealth of every subject was publicly announced and the best trader was congratulated. Subjects received explicit incentives as their final wealth was converted into grade: they were announced verbally and in the written document that their grade for the finance course would reflect the final wealth. The grade for the course is between 0 and 20. Students participating to 10 replications of the game earned bonus points (to be added to their final exam grade to determine the course grade) equal to: Five cohorts (playing under the WT regime) did not receive explicit strong incentives as their earnings were not converted into grade. In the empirical analysis, I provide robustness checks to show that this does not affect the results.
Cohorts are indexed by the date of the session in which they participated and by the number of the session on the given day. If there were explicit incentives, the cohort's number finishes with an "i".
The timing of a session is displayed in Figure 1. 
2.2) Market institutions

2.2.1) Walrasian Tâtonnement
The WT is a price driven auction mechanism whereby an auctioneer announces prices at which traders engage in transactions as soon as demand equals supply. As long as demand does not equalize to supply, the price is adjusted following the sign of the excess demand: an increase (decline) in the price follows a positive (negative) excess demand. More precisely, the experimental market processes as follows.
1 Despite Camerer and Hogarth (1999) argue that explicit incentives do not systematically have a significant impact on market experiments, I recognize that the lack of explicit incentives might constitute a drawback of the present analysis. I thus plan to replicate the experiment using explicit incentives in order to evaluate the robustness of the results. The new data will be available in November 2000 and will be included in the next version of this paper.
Step 1: the central auctioneer publicly announces a price that equals the expected common value of the asset, i.e. • 5.
Step 2: subjects privately submit one unit 2 market orders to buy or to sell at the announced price, P. If the aggregate demand (D) equals the aggregate supply (S), step 3 occurs; otherwise we proceed to step 4.
Step 3: the tâtonnement stops and a multilateral transaction occurs at the announced price P. Note that if D=S=0, subjects end up the replication with their initial wealth.
Step 4: subjects observe the excess demand (D-S) and a new price (P') is announced which is equal to:
P'=P+1 if D-S>0 and P'=P-1 if D-S<0. We then proceed to step 2. However, note that the tenth announced price is necessarily a transaction price. When at this price demand and supply do not equalize, the following rationing rule is applied: when the excess demand is equal to x>0 (x<0), x subjects are randomly selected among the buying (selling) agents and are excluded from the transaction.
The updating rule specified in this tâtonnement process implies that if, at the announced price, the excess demand is positive (negative), the price rises (falls) by one Euro whatever the magnitude of the imbalance is. This updating rule and the entire tâtonnement mechanism rules are publicly explained at the beginning of each session.
2.2.2) Call Market
A CM is a uniform-price sealed bid offer auction: it is an order-driven market in which traders submit limit orders. These orders are aggregated to determine the market clearing price. Buying (selling) orders with a limit price greater (smaller) than or equal to the market clearing price are executed. More specifically, the experimental market processes as follows.
Step 1: subjects privately submit one unit buying and/or selling limit orders to the central auctioneer.
Subjects can choose any positive round limit price they want from 0 to 10.
Step 2: the central auctioneer aggregates the orders to build supply and demand curves.
Step 3: the market-clearing price is determined so as to minimize the absolute excess demand. If several prices satisfy this minimizing condition, the trading volume maximizing price is chosen. If more than one price still remain and if the sign of the excess demand does not change over these prices, the market clearing price is defined to be the highest (lowest) price if demand is greater (smaller) than supply. In the other cases, the market clearing price is randomly determined, every price in the set satisfying all the conditions being equally likely. Note that, for a given market-clearing price, if a trader is on the buying and on the selling sides of the market, her orders cancel out.
Step 4: the market-clearing price is publicly announced. A multilateral transaction occurs at this market clearing price: buying orders are executed if their limit price is greater or equal than the market clearing price; selling orders are executed if their limit price is smaller than or equal to the market clearing price. When at this price demand and supply do not equalize, the following rationing rule is applied: when the excess demand is equal to x>0 (x<0), x subjects are randomly selected among the buying (selling) agents and are excluded from the transaction.
The CM bears some similarities with a second-price auction since traders do not pay or receive what they bid (i.e. their limit price) but rather a more advantageous market-clearing price. This characteristic as well as the CM rules are publicly announced at the beginning of each session.
Note that under the CM regime, traders cannot observe tentative prices or excess demands as under the WT regime. In addition, they do not have access to the order book before submitting their bids.
3) Theoretical analysis 3
The equilibrium analysis derived in this section is inspired by Radner (1979) who demonstrates the generic existence of a unique separating rational expectations equilibrium in a competitive economy under asymmetric information. Unfortunately, his arguments do not apply directly to my setting because of the strategic nature of the experimental environment. Moreover, as the strategic interactions depend on the market structure, I cannot elude the analysis of each particular trading mechanism.
The following theoretical analysis has been design to fit perfectly the timing of the trading game described above either under the WT or under the CM. I assume that the structure of the game is common knowledge and, during the experiment, I endeavor to assure that this assumption holds.
During the experiment and in this analysis, all orders are only valid for one unit.
Apart from their preferences, agents can differ in two dimensions: their information and their private value. There are four possible agents' types: "+1" insiders who receive a perfect signal and have a private value equal to +1, "-1" insiders, "+1" uninformed agents and "-1" uninformed agents. The following proposition states the existence of a fully revealing equilibrium under the WT.
Proposition 1
Consider the environment defined in the experimental design. Given the rules of the WT described in subsection 2.2, whatever the risk preferences of the agents, the trading game admits a fully revealing Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. The corresponding equilibrium strategy profile is the following.
-As long as the tentative price is in the [3, 7] interval, insiders buy if the announced price is below the common value of the asset, sell if it is above, and uninformed agents submit no order.
-When the tentative price reaches either 2 or 8, "+1" agents buy and "-1" agents sell,
independently from receiving a signal or not.
-If the tentative price ever hits 1 (respectively 9), all agents buy (respectively sell).
Considering the case where there are on the market two "+1" and two "-1" insiders, and two "+1" and two "-1" uninformed traders, the evolution of announced prices and agents' actions along the equilibrium path is displayed below for V=8.
-the 2 "+1 insiders": Buy Q=Demand-Supply=+4
-the 2 "+1 insiders": Buy -the 2 "-1 insiders": Sell -the 2 "+1 uninformed": Buy -the 2 "-1 uninformed": Sell
When the common value is 2, the tentative prices equilibrium path is the following P 1 =5, P 2 =4, P 3 =3, P 4 =2. Overall, the equilibrium outcomes are the following: when V=2, the transaction price is 2, 4 asset units are traded and all the gains from trade are exploited (i.e. the total surplus is equal to 8).
When V=8, the transaction price is 8, 4 asset units are traded and all the gains from trade are exploited (i.e. the total surplus is also equal to 8). At equilibrium, the order flow is fully revealing: observing the successive excess demands or the evolution of the tentative prices, uninformed traders discover the final value of the asset.
The intuition behind the proof of this proposition is the following. The experimental design specifies that there are at least two agents having the same private value and the same signal. Since the price adjustment during the WT depends only on the sign of the excess demand (and not on its size), a unilateral deviation from an agent does not change the price path as long as the tâtonnement has not equilibrated. Thus deviations do not hinder the price discovery process and therefore are not worth undertaking.
The following proposition states the existence of a fully revealing equilibrium under the CM.
Proposition 2
Consider the environment defined in the experimental design. Given the rules of the CM described in subsection 2.2, whatever the risk preferences of the agents, the trading game admits a fully revealing
Bayesian Equilibrium. The corresponding equilibrium strategy profile is:
-When V=2, "+1 insiders" place a limit order to buy for a price lower than or equal to 2 and "-1 insiders" place a limit order to sell for a price greater than or equal to 2. When V=8, "+1 insiders" place a limit order to buy for a price lower than or equal to 8 and "-1 insiders" place a limit order to sell for a price lower than or equal to 8.
-"+1 uninformed" agents submit a limit order to buy for a price lower or equal to 8 and "-1 uninformed" agents submit a limit order to sell for a price greater or equal to 2.
Considering the case where there are on the market two "+1" and two "-1" insiders, and two "+1" and two "-1" uninformed traders, the aggregate demand and supply curves generated by the equilibrium strategies when V=8 are displayed in Figure 2 . Overall, the equilibrium outcomes are the following:
when V=2, the transaction price is 2, 4 asset units are traded and all the gains from trade are exploited (i.e. the total surplus is equal to 8). When V=8, the transaction price is 8, 4 asset units are traded and Q=0 Transaction all the gains from trade are exploited (i.e. the total surplus is also equal to 8). At equilibrium, the insiders trade aggressively on their information as there is only one round of trading. Prices adjust to their actions and reveal their information. Anticipating that prices are informative, uninformed agents can submit market orders to buy or to sell (depending on their private value) and participate to the transaction at a fully revealing price.
The idea of the proof of this proposition is the following. In the CM, the transaction price is the market clearing price and not the limit price announced by a trader. If an agent deviates and modifies her limit price, this will either have no influence on the market outcome or it will exclude the agent from trading if the limit price bypasses the market clearing price. Hence no deviation appears profitable.
In Proposition 1 and 2, the gains from trade are shared equally among agents: every trader receives a surplus of 1 • whatever the common value of the asset. However there exist other fully revealing equilibria with the same allocations in which some agents get a surplus of 2 • and others get 0. The proofs proposed in the appendix concentrate on the existence of equilibria in which the surplus is equally shared among agents but the same arguments apply when the gains from trade are asymmetrically distributed among agents. In these cases, the transaction price can be 1 or 3 when the common value of the asset equals 2, and 7 or 9 when the common value is 8.
Propositions 1 and 2 characterize fully revealing equilibria in the two market structures. The question is now to determine whether non-revealing equilibria exist. Note first that a partially revealing equilibrium cannot exist as there are only two potential common values. Second, at a non-revealing equilibrium, the price has to be the same whatever the common value. Such a non-revealing equilibrium does not exist with all agents trading, whatever the market structure. However when only "+1" (resp. "-1") uninformed agents trade along with the insiders, a non-revealing equilibrium exist with a price equal to 2 (resp. 8). This is stated in proposition 3.
Proposition 3
Whatever the market structure, given the environment defined in the experimental design, i) there exists no non-revealing equilibrium with all agents trading, ii) 2 is a non-revealing equilibrium price with "+1" uninformed agents buying, "-1" uninformed agents not trading, "+1" insiders buying whatever the common value, "-1" insiders buying when V=8 and selling when V=2, and iii) 8 is a
non-revealing equilibrium price with "-1" uninformed agents selling, "+1" uninformed agents not trading, "-1" insiders selling whatever the common value, "+1" insiders buying when V=8 and selling when V=2.
On the WT, an example of non-revealing equilibrium with a price of 2 is given by the following strategy profile:
Whatever the common value, insiders sell as long as the announced price is greater than 2 and buy if it is smaller. When the price reaches 2, if V=2, "+1" insiders buy and "-1" insiders sell, and if V=8, all insiders buy.
"+1" uninformed agents sell as long as the announced price is greater than 2, and buy if it is smaller or equal to 2.
"-1" uninformed agents do not submit any order.
On the CM, an example of non-revealing equilibrium with a price of 2 is given by the following strategy profile 4 :
When V=2, "+1" insiders submit a limit order to buy for a price lower or equal to 2 and "-1"
insiders submit a limit order to sell for a price greater or equal to 2. When V=8, all insiders buy for a price smaller of equal to 2.
"+1" uninformed agents place an order to buy at a price smaller or equal to 2. "-1" uninformed agents do not submit any order.
In the experimental environment considered in this paper, the WT and the CM, as defined in subsection 2.2, have the same theoretical properties: the same non-revealing and revealing equilibria exist on the two market structures. At the separating equilibria, prices exhibit strong informational efficiency and all the gains from trade are exploited. This similarity between the two institutions can be interpreted in light of the revenue equivalence theorem derived in auction theory. Indeed, one can observe that the WT is in the spirit of an English Auction in which prices are adjusted upward until only one buyer remains (i.e. until demand equals supply). On the other hand, in the CM, orders are not executed at their limit price but at the market clearing price. This is in the spirit of a Second Price (Vickrey) Auction in which agents privately submit bids and where the agent with the highest bid wins the object but pays only the second highest bid. Just as the English Auction is strategically equivalent to the Second Price Auction, in the environment considered here, the WT is strategically equivalent to the CM.
4) Empirical analysis
In the previous section, I have derived equilibrium predictions adapted to the mixed common / private value experimental environment with asymmetric information. The WT and the CM were shown to be strategically equivalent. The objective of the present section is to study whether the observed behavior in experimental markets conforms with the predictions of the financial theory. In subsections 4.1 to 4.3, only the last four replications of each experimental session are taken into account in the empirical analysis to escape from non stationary phenomena. However, in order to give a comprehensive view of the date, all the replications are used to generate the tables and the figures. Subsection 4.4 tackles the learning issue and examines whether the lack of incentives in five out of eight cohorts under the WT regime has an influence on the results. Results in this section are stated using sign tests, Wilcoxon rank tests, chi-square tests and run tests. These are non-parametric statistical tools 5 that cope with the low number of observations.
4.1) Price formation
I start by studying the relative performance of the two trading mechanisms in term of informational efficiency. To build on these graphical impressions, I compute the absolute deviation between prices and common values for each replication of each cohort. The data are listed in Table 2 , with Panel A corresponding to the WT and Panel B to the CM.
To assess the informational efficiency of prices, I construct the confidence interval for the median of the Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD) per cohort, using data from Table 2 . Remember that when the common value of the asset is 2 (respectively 8), 1, 2 or 3 (respectively 7, 8, 9) are potential fully revealing prices. Thus it appears appropriate to compare the MAD between prices and common values to 1 rather than to 0. In my experimental financial markets, the median of the MAD lies between 0.0 and 1.0 with a 96% confidence level. This leads to the following result.
Result 1. Pooling the data from the two market structures, prices display an almost perfect informational efficiency.
Such fully revealing prices indicate that subjects or at least insiders coordinate on playing the separating equilibria. A possible explanation for such a coordination is that the fully revealing equilibria dominate the non-revealing equilibria in the sense of Pareto. More convincingly, it appears that the fully revealing equilibria correspond to the equilibrium situations in which the surplus of the insiders is maximal. If insiders as a group could decide whether to coordinate on a revealing or a non revealing equilibrium, they would choose the revealing one. Even if uninformed agents were to play another equilibrium, this choice would generate the highest payoff for insiders.
In order to determine whether the informational efficiency of prices differs across market structures, I
perform a Wilcoxon rank test. The rank sum W is 31 and the p-value for no difference is 0.80. Thus the hypothesis that the MAD are not different in the two trading mechanisms cannot be rejected.
Result 2. The WT and the CM exhibit the same informational efficiency.
The informational efficiency of prices is the same on the two market structures indicating, following the theoretical analysis, that no trading mechanism allows insiders to earn high profits while concealing their information.
4.2) Allocations
If people coordinate on a fully revealing equilibrium, all the potential gains from trade are extracted.
Comparing the surpluses exploited in the experimental markets and the full extraction level, I shed some light on the relative ability of the two trading mechanisms to achieve the efficient allocation. To reinforce this graphical analysis, I use the Wicoxon rank test to determine whether differences exist between the allocative efficiencies of the two trading mechanisms. The data are shown in Table 3 , Panel A and B for the WT and the CM respectively. The rank sum W is 10 and the p-value for no difference is 0.00. I thus reject (at the 1% level) the null hypothesis of no difference across market structures.
Result 3. The WT mechanism allows more gains from trade to be exploited than the CM.
This lower efficiency of the CM goes along with a lower trading volume. The data are listed in Table   4 , Panels A and B. The rank sum W is 10 and the p-value of no difference is 0.00.
Result 4. The trading volume is lower on the CM than on the WT.
The two uniform-price mechanisms under examination are theoretically equivalent: the two market structures have exactly the same equilibria. Yet when organizing the interactions of human traders, these two institutions do not display the same performance. The trading activity is more intense and the exploited gains from trade are higher on the WT than on the CM. Results 3 and 4 are at the core of my empirical investigation. They call for a deeper analysis of trading behavior at the individual level in order to find out the origin of this disparity.
4.3) Individual behavior
This section is devoted to the analysis of individual traders' behavior. I use the separating equilibria as theoretical benchmarks. Prices in the experiment are strongly efficient, meaning that insiders were playing fully revealing strategies. This implies that uninformed agents should play according the strategies that are optimal in the revealing equilibria.
4.3.1) Uninformed agents versus insiders' behavior
Consider uninformed and informed agents as two separate groups. At equilibrium, the two groups should participate to the transactions and get an equal part of the surplus. Call S u the total surplus exploited by the n u uninformed traders, and S i the total surplus exploited by the n i insiders. To measure the distribution of the surplus between the two groups, I compute the ratio (S u /S i )-(n u /n i ). At equilibrium, this distribution variable is zero. Indeed the way the equilibrium surplus (equal to the number of agents) is shared does not depend on the information type but on the private values of the agents. S u should thus equal n u and S i should equal n i . When the distribution variable is positive, it means that uninformed agents have extracted more surplus than insiders whereas when the variable is negative, it means that uninformed agents have extracted less surplus than insiders. The data generated in the experiment under the two market structures are presented in Table 5 .
Under the WT mechanism, the distribution variable is not significantly different from zero: a sign test with n=6 and S=1 induces a p-value of 0.094. Indeed while the null hypothesis that the median is zero is rejected at the 10% level, this hypothesis is not rejected at the 5% or 1% levels.
Result 5. Under the WT, the surplus is evenly shared between uninformed traders and insiders.
This result indicates that, under the WT, uninformed and informed subjects' behavior conform with theoretical predictions. Comparing the distribution variable under the two market structures with a
Wilcoxon rank sum test gives rise to a p-value equal to 0.01 (n 1 =8, n 2 =4 and W=12). Thus the hypothesis that the distribution variable is identical on the CM and on the WT can be rejected at the 1% level.
Result 6. On the CM, uninformed agents extract less surplus than insiders.
To capture the idea that uninformed agents may have a different ability to participate to transactions on the two market structures, I consider the level of activity of uninformed and informed traders. At equilibrium, all traders should participate. The participation rate of uninformed traders as well as insiders should be one. The rates observed in the experiment are presented in Table 6 for uninformed agents and Table 7 for insiders. Note that these figures correspond to the proportion of traders willing to participate in the transactions: they include the transacting agents as well as the agents that have been rationed.
I first compare the proportion of participating insiders under the WT and the CM regimes. The
Wilcoxon rank test generates a rank sum W=10 (n 1 =8 and n 2 =4). The p-value is 0.00. The hypothesis that insiders' participation is the same on the two market structures can thus be rejected.
Result 7. Insiders participate less to the trading process on the CM than on the WT.
I then compare the proportion of uninformed agents willing to trade at the market clearing price on the WT and on the CM. The Wilcoxon test generates a rank sum W=10 (n 1 =8 and n 2 =4). The p-value is 0.00 so I can also reject the hypothesis of no difference between the two market structures.
Result 8. Uninformed agents participate less to the trading process on the CM than on the WT.
The proportion of uninformed agents willing to trade at the market clearing price appears very low on the CM (on average 48% during the last four replications of a session).
I now assess the extent to which receiving a signal influences agents' trading behavior on a given market structure. First I compare the participation rates of insiders and uninformed traders on the WT.
The Wilcoxon rank test produces a rank sum W=56,5 (n 1 =8 and n 2 =8). The p-value is 0.11. Thus the null hypothesis of no difference between the behavior of informed and uninformed agents cannot be rejected at the 10% level.
Result 9. Under the WT, the participation rates of uninformed and informed agents are identical.
I then compare the participation rates of insiders and uninformed traders on the CM. The Wilcoxon rank test generates a rank sum W=11,5 (n 1 =4 and n 2 =4). The p-value is 0.03 so the hypothesis that the participation of insiders and uninformed traders are the same on the two market structures can be rejected.
Result 10. Under the CM, the participation rate of uninformed traders is smaller than insiders' one.
Despite fully revealing prices, uninformed agents on the CM did not manage to extract all their potential surplus because they did not participate enough in the transactions. Furthermore, even insiders participate less to the trading process on the CM than on the WT. These behaviors are at the source of the allocative inefficiencies observed under the CM mechanism.
4.3.2) Behavioral typology in the CM
To improve the understanding of uninformed agents' behavior in the CM trading game, I classify subjects' actions into four categories. For a "+1 uninformed trader", these categories are:
-action I: submit a limit order to buy with a limit price P b =7, 8 or 9 and a limit order to sell for P s 9 (with P b <P s ); -action II: submit a limit order to buy with P b <7 and a limit order to sell for P s 9; -action III: submit no order; -action IV: submit a limit order to buy with P b <7 and a limit order to sell for 3<P s 8 (with
For a "-1 uninformed trader", the symmetric four categories are: -action I: submit a limit order to buy with a limit price P b 1 and a limit order to sell for P s =1, 2 or 3 (with P b <P s ); -action II: submit a limit order to buy with a limit price P b 1 and a limit order to sell for P s >3; -action III: submit no order; -action IV: submit a limit order to buy with P b >1 and a limit order to sell for P s >3 (with P b <P s ).
Action I corresponds to the equilibrium strategy profile of the uninformed agents. Action II allows an uninformed agent to participate with profit to fully revealing transactions with an ex-ante probability of one half provided that other agents play according to the fully revealing equilibria. Action III induces no participation in any transaction. Action IV corresponds to the choice of an agent that would not take into account the adverse selection component of the order flow. For instance, if a "+1 uninformed trader" chooses to buy until 6 and to sell above (this would correspond to the choice of a risk neutral agent that disregards the winner's curse), this action leads to participation in the transactions with an ex-ante probability of one-half but generates a loss if the other agents play the separating equilibrium strategies. Remark that if one chooses to bet on a particular realization of the common value, this move would be coded either as action I or as action IV. Thus action I does not only include equilibrium actions. However for a given agent, if an action IV is found out after several actions I, these previous actions I treated as action IV. This coding option refines the contents of action I to fit as closely as possible the equilibrium strategy. It is based on the premise that if an uninformed agent has discovered the optimal strategy given that the insiders' trading reveals their information, it seems not plausible that she would switch to a less profitable action. Figure 5 plots the distribution of choices of the uninformed agents under the CM regime (4 cohorts: 1026001i, 1026002i ,1026003i, 1030001i) along the 10 replications. It appears that the actions of the subjects are concentrated in two categories: action II and action IV. Moreover the proportion of action IV seems to decline over time while the proportion of action I tends to increase. The data are presented in Table 8 .
Chi-square is used to test the significance of actions II and IV attraction. The null hypothesis is that subjects choose each action with the same probability, one fourth. For each of the last four replications of the game, this test generates p-values lower than 0,025. So we can reject the hypothesis that the observed clustering of uninformed subjects' choices is due to chance.
Result 11. Action II attracts 47% of uninformed agents' choices in the CM, and action IV, 32%.
We now study the distribution of insiders' actions presented in Table 9 . Figure 6 plots the distribution of insiders' choices under the CM regime (4 cohorts: 1026001i, 1026002i ,1026003i, 1030001i) along the 10 replications. The categories are the same as before except that action I is replaced by action I* which is defined so as to correspond to insiders revealing equilibrium strategy. Again, the null hypothesis is that subjects choose each action with the same probability, one fourth. For each of the last four replications of the game, the chi-square test generates p-values lower than 0,001. So we can reject the hypothesis that the observed clustering of informed subjects' choices is due to chance.
Result 12. Action I* attracts 85% of informed agents' choices in the CM, and action II, 12%.
At the separating equilibrium, 100% of the actions should be in category I or I*. While insiders' behavior is in line with this prediction, the uninformed agents' choices are dissonant with respect to the revealing equilibrium predictions.
Actions II and IV that attract uninformed agents' behavior (and, at a lower extent, insiders' behavior as far as action II is concerned) induce a lower participation rate than the equilibrium action. Thus result 11 and 12 explain the fact that uninformed agents and insiders fail to participate in all the transactions on the CM despite the fully revealing prices.
4.4) Learning and robustness checks
To understand the agents' behavior in the CM, I search for an evolution in the choice pattern across the 10 replications of the game. A run test is applied to the proportion of choices attracted by a particular action for the uninformed agents as well as for the insiders. The results are in table 10. They suggest that some uninformed agents learn to avoid damaging choices (the p-value for no evolution in action IV is 0.012) and that others discover the optimal strategy given that prices are revealing (the pvalue for no evolution in action I is 0.012).
Result 13. Uninformed subjects learn to avoid loss generating actions IV. The attractiveness of action I increases with experience while the attractiveness of action II remains constant.
The run tests for insiders' behavior indicate that the high proportion of action I* is the result of a learning process (the p-value for no evolution in action I is 0.004). With experience informed subjects learn to avoid low performing strategies (the p-value for no evolution in action II is 0.012, and it is 0.021 for action IV) and switched to the equilibrium action.
Result 14. Informed subjects learn to play the fully revealing equilibrium action I*. The attractiveness of action II and IV decreases with experience.
Overall, in the CM regime, subjects whether informed or not are able to avoid losses. Despite action I attractiveness increases with experience, the low absolute number of uninformed traders that find out the equilibrium strategy does not speak for a clear equilibrium discovery. These subjects stick to a behavior (action II) that is not optimal given other traders' strategies. On the other hand, insiders learn to play the fully revealing equilibrium (which is the one that is the most profitable for them).
Finally, I check whether the lack of incentives for some cohorts under the WT regime may have any influence on the results. Wilcoxon tests are run on each variable of interest (price and surplus efficiency, surplus distribution,…) to test the null hypothesis that the two samples of observations (with or without incentives) come from the same population. Results are in table 11. The p-values are greater than 0.05, indicating that the null hypothesis of no difference cannot be rejected at the 5% level.
Result 15. The lack of incentives for 5 out of 8 cohorts under the WT regime does not influence the analysis.
4.5) Interpretations
This section investigates the nature of the deviations observed during the experiment, and the influence of microstructure on the process of market equilibration.
4.5.1) The nature of deviations
Why do people deviate from equilibrium? The theoretical analysis presented in section 3 has been designed to fit exactly the experimental setting. Since the only element that is not controlled by the experimenter is subjects' cognition, the only admissible reason why equilibrium does not arise in the experiment is bounded rationality (considered in a broad sense which includes coordination problems).
The question is now to determine what kind of bound is at the origin of the observed behavior. One could call upon non-rational expectations (see Williams (1987) ), strategic uncertainty (see Crawford (1997)), unsystematic errors (Stanovitch and West (2000) ), judgement biases ) or computational limitations (Pingle and Day (1993) ). Even though the present experiment has not been shaped to discriminate between these competing hypotheses, a few of them can be discussed in light of the experimental data.
First, if people do not have rational expectations, they will maximize their expected utility given beliefs that do not perfectly take into account the link between prices and the information available on the market. In this case, the chosen actions may not correspond to the equilibrium strategies. As prices within every experimental session were consistently set at efficient levels (results 1 and 2), this hypothesis appears unsatisfactory: there is little chance that subjects did not recognize the fully revealing nature of prices 7 .
On the other hand, if people form rational expectations but if there is strategic uncertainty 8 , there could be a non-null probability that prices would not reveal the underlying state of nature. In this situation, action II could be the most preferred action for a risk averse uninformed agent in the CM because this action when properly designed leads to quite frequent profits without taking any risk. As action II has often been chosen by uninformed traders (results 11 and 13), strategic uncertainty constitutes a plausible explanation for the deviations from equilibrium in the experiment. However, it cannot be the only source of deviation. Indeed, whatever the equilibrium chosen by the uninformed traders, insiders are better off by choosing the revealing equilibrium strategies. In this sense, they do not face strategic uncertainty but still all insiders have not chosen the revealing equilibrium action (result 12).
Third, unsystematic errors result from a lack of attention or a distraction. This kind of irrationality should not depend on the structure of the market. Since the ability of traders to participate to transactions was lower on the CM than on the WT (result 7 and 8), observed deviations cannot only be due to unsystematic errors.
Fourth, deviations from equilibrium may be due to computational limits. Computational limits are defined as the difficulty to run the adequate reasoning for a given task or as the cost associated with 7 This hypothesis have not been tested formally but discussions with subjects suggest that they were indeed aware of the fully revealing nature of prices. 8 A subject faces strategic uncertainty if she expects the other agents not to follow systematically equilibrium strategies. Strategic uncertainty may also be created by a coordination problem when people are not sure about the equilibrium chosen by the other players.
such a problem solving. These limits should be reflected in the ability of traders to participate to the trading process: if the CM was as demanding as the WT in terms of the algorithmic ability of agents, traders' participation rate should not differ across the two market structures. As agents' participation to the transactions is lower on the CM than on the WT (results 7 and 8), it is possible that deviations from equilibrium in the experiment are due to computational limits. Moreover one can imagine that it is more demanding for an uninformed agent than for an insider that knows perfectly the asset value to adequately design her order. As it appears that insiders are better than uninformed agents at finding out profitable strategies in the CM (result 10), this pleads also in favor of the existence of computational limits.
Overall, several interpretations are consistent with the findings of this paper. Deviations from equilibrium can be due to strategic uncertainty, unsystematic errors, computational limits or to judgement errors. In all these cases, it appears that the resource-limited nature of human cognition is driving the results. The next subsection will explore the role of market microstructure in such a context of bounded rationality.
4.5.2) The role of market microstructure
Up to now, I have stated that the WT allowed more gains from trade to be exploited than the CM. In this latter market structure, the uninformed traders did not manage to find out the equilibrium strategy because of limited cognitive capacities.
The WT appears to partly overcome such bounds on individual rationality. A possible interpretation is the following. During a WT, agents can observe the successive tentative prices and compare their asset valuation to these prices to decide whether to buy, to sell or not to trade. This mechanism is "explicit" in the sense that the market process gives direct access to the price at which agents will possibly trade (see Johnson-Laird (1988) ).
On the opposite, during a CM, traders when designing their orders do not know the transaction price:
they have to put themselves, for each price level, in a situation where a transaction would occur. This mechanism is "implicit" because it does not provide agents with the precise conditions at which trading will occur.
In line with Camerer and Hogarth (2000) , choosing a particular market microstructure may be viewed as designing traders' task. The precise manner in which market microstructure, and in particular the WT, affects subjects ability to find out equilibrium strategies depends on the type of the deviations from equilibrium that is considered. If people do not play their equilibrium strategy because they expect their opponents to deviate as well, some market institutions may align expectation about traders' rationality and thus reduce strategic uncertainty. On the other hand, if people tend to use heuristics to make judgements during the game, these heuristics may be more damaging in some market structures than in others. Finally, some trading venues may generate more tractable mental representations (see Camerer (1999) ) that are less demanding in terms of decision costs.
Overall, limitations on human cognition create market distortions. In my experiment, the WT provides a way to economize on these cognitive transaction costs. The greater performance of the WT in the experiment can be explained by the "explicit" nature of its trading process as it reduces strategic uncertainty, limits the consequences of judgmental errors or is more easy to handle with. The "explicit" nature of the WT derives from its transparency. As opposed to the CM, during the WT, traders can observe the evolution of tentative prices and excess demands. Although in theory, the greater pre-trade transparency of the WT has no influence on market performances, this paper shows that it may still be an important factor of efficiency through its effect on traders' cognitive capacity.
5) Conclusion
This paper analyzes the effects of microstructure on the trading process in experimental financial markets inspired by Plott and Sunder (1982) . The performance of two uniform-price mechanisms, the Walrasian Tâtonnement and the Call Market, are studied under asymmetric information. Gametheoretical predictions are derived for each market structure. At equilibrium, prices are fully revealing and all the gains from trade are exploited. The two market mechanisms are strategically equivalent.
I find that prices are efficient whatever the market structure considered but that the surplus extracted on the Walrasian Tâtonnement (on average 67% of the maximum gains from trade) is higher than on the Call Market (on average 23%) together with a higher volume. Uninformed traders do not manage to participate to the Call Market trading process as much as they should which generates a low volume of transaction and a poor market performance. Several cognitive factors may be at the origin of this behavior: strategic uncertainty, judgement errors or computational limitations.
In this context, a possible interpretation is the following. The Walrasian Tâtonnement can be viewed as an "explicit" mechanism in the sense that the execution price is know before a transaction occurs.
This characteristic is crucial as it can explain the reduction in all the cognitive limitations listed above.
The Walrasian Tâtonnement offers a way to economize on cognitive transaction costs as it allows significantly higher gains from trade to be extracted.
This analysis underlines the importance of the adequacy between market mechanisms and traders' cognitive ability. The Chicago Stock Exchange has adopted flat panel displays to replace its old computers' monitors arguing that it was beneficial to the exchange's floor traders (Wall Street & Technology, June 2000) . Superior brightness, color and off-angle viewing, and power savings were put forward. This new technology supports the new stock options trading process on the AMEX and is recognized to provide extra room and huge time savings (Computer World, August 25, 1997) . This paper suggests that market organizers could also benefit from designing financial market institutions incorporating cognitively ergonomic features that fit the limited nature of human rationality.
Instructions to the subjects in the trading game
In this trading game you will have the opportunity to buy and sell shares. You will play 10 replications of the trading game. At the beginning of each replication you will receive 10 • . During the game you will have the opportunity to place orders to buy or sell the shares. (You can sell more shares than you own, i.e., short sales are allowed). At the end of each replication, you will compute the value of your final wealth, equal to the sum of: your initial cash: 10 • , minus the cost of your share purchases, plus the proceeds from your share sales, plus the final value of your portfolio. The final value of your portfolio is equal to the number of shares you own at the end of the replication, multiplied by the final value of each share. The final value of the shares is the sum of two elements.
The first element is a value that is common to all traders. This common value is drawn randomly (and independently from the previous draws). It can be 2 or 8, with equal probability ½.
The second element is a private value. This private value remains the same during all the replications. Half of the subjects have the private value +1 and the other half have the private value -1.
For example, if your only trade was the purchase of one share at price 6, the common value of the shares is 8, and your private value is -1, your final wealth is: 10 -6 + (8 -1) = 11. In the same situation, if your private value is +1, your final wealth is: 10 -6 + (8 + 1) = 13. Since you can sell more shares than you own, you can end up with a negative number of shares held at the end of the replication. For example, if you sold 1 share at price 4, the common value of the shares is 2, and your private value is +1, your final wealth is: 10 + 4 -(2 + 1) = 11. In the same situation, if your private value is -1, your final wealth is: 10 + 4 -(2 -1) = 13.
At the beginning of each replication, half of the agents will receive a private information (keep it secret, don't reveal it to the others !). This private information reveals perfectly the common value of the shares.
Trading processes as follows.
Step 1: the auctioneer announces a price P which is equal to the unconditional expectation of the common value element. P = ½ * 2 + ½ * 8 = 5.
Step 2: you can place an order to buy or to sell one share at the announced price. If the aggregate supply S equals the aggregate demand D, a transaction occurs at the announced price, the common value is publicly revealed and final wealth are computed. If not, we proceed to step 3.
Step 3: the difference between supply and demand is publicly observed and a new price P' is announced. This price is computed as follows: P' = P + 1 when D>S and P' = P -1 when D<S, where P is the previously announced price. We then proceed to step 2. Your private value is .
Proof of proposition 1
Denote P t the t th price announcement. The out-of-equilibrium beliefs that sustain the equilibrium are the following. Whatever the magnitude of the excess demand, confronted with a price increase (decrease) from P t-1 to P t (as long as these prices belong to the set 9 , 1 9 ) when uninformed traders have to submit their orders for the round t, these agents believe that the common value is 8 (2). Consider that eight agents (two "+1" and two "-1" insiders, and two "+1" and two "-1" uninformed traders) are on the marketplace and suppose that the common value V of the asset is equal to 8. Every order is valid for only one unit of the asset. As the other agents only concentrate on the price path (and not on the size of the excess demand) to update their beliefs concerning the common value, the dynamics of their beliefs is not modified with respect to the equilibrium. Thus such a deviation does not produce an outcome different from the equilibrium one.
Consequently, deviating does not produce a larger utility to agent i than the equilibrium. . At this price, "+1" insiders buy and "-1" insiders sell and, since a price increase has been observed, uninformed traders believing that V=8 do not submit any order. Hence, the initial deviating action creates a loop that is not profitable for agent i (whether informed or not) since after one iteration, the price comes back to its level when agent i deviated.
Assume now that 9 t . As before, the deviation lowers the price to 1 10 P . This price is the last announced one whatever the excess demand but, as there is no trade at this price, ) 10 ( The price of 2 is the last announced one whatever the excess demand. At this price, the aggregate demand is 3 units while the aggregate supply is 5 units. As agent i is on the selling side, she might be rationed with probability Consequently, the equilibrium strategy dominates the other strategies.
All the arguments developed in this proof extend to the case where there are more agents in each category.
Indeed, the crucial feature is to have at least two identical agents of each type (identical in terms of information and private value endowments but not in terms of preferences).
QED
Remark that if, for example, V=2 and the price reaches 8 before the 10 th announcement, the equilibrium strategies would not generate a transaction. Indeed, the aggregate demand would be 2 units, originating from the 2 "+1" uninformed traders, while the aggregate supply would be 6 units, originating from the 2 "-1" uninformed traders and from the 4 insiders. The fact that no transaction occurs in this situation is somehow a good property of the equilibrium strategies because it insures that if insiders could collude and manipulate the price path, they
could not manage to fool the uninformed traders. This holds before the 10 th announcement round and as long as side payments between colluding insiders do not exist.
Proof of proposition 2
Consider that eight agents (two "+1" and two "-1" insiders and two "+1" and two "-1" uninformed agents) are on the marketplace.
Denote U i the utility of agent i. Assume that U i (.) is increasing. At equilibrium, her utility is: ) 11 (
To show that no deviation is profitable, consider first that agent i moves her limit price away from the market clearing price P * . This change has no influence on the market clearing price and thus does not increase the utility of agent i. Consider now that agent i moves her limit price towards the market clearing price. If the limit price does not go beyond the market clearing price, this change has no influence on the market clearing price and again does not increase the utility of agent i. Finally, if the limit price goes beyond the market clearing price, she will be excluded from the transaction. Indeed, agent i's deviation will leave an absolute excess demand of 1 unit at price P * . When every agent plays equilibrium, the absolute excess demand is greater or equal to 2 at the price levels different from P * . Thus agent i has no chance to be involved in transaction at another price than P * . This last deviation excludes agent i from the transaction. She gets the utility ) 10 (
Consequently, each equilibrium strategy dominates (either strictly or weakly) the other strategies.
QED
Proof of proposition 3
Suppose that the following agents are present on the market: two "+1" and two "-1" insiders, and two "+1" and two "-1" uninformed agents.
I consider that a price P is a pooling equilibrium price if it does not depend on the underlying state of the world (i.e. the common value of the asset).
The following lemma concerns insiders' behavior and will prove useful in showing that proposition 3 holds.
Lemma:
Consider the transaction price P. For any P belonging to the {4,5,6} interval, all insiders trade (or submit nonnull orders) in the same direction: they buy (sell) when the price is smaller (greater) than the common value.
Suppose that P=3. If V=2, "+1" insiders are indifferent between buying and selling while "-1" insiders are selling. If V=8 all insiders are buying. Suppose that P=7. If V=8, "-1" insiders are indifferent between buying and selling while "+1" insiders are buying. If V=2, all insiders are selling.
Suppose that P=2. If V=2, "+1" insiders are buying and "-1" insiders are selling. If V=8 all insiders are buying.
Suppose that P=8. If V=8, "-1" insiders are selling and "+1" insiders are buying. If V=2, all insiders are selling.
Proof:
In my setting, an insider has only one trading opportunity to benefit from her informational advantage.
Anticipating that a transaction will occur at a price P, she will thus be willing to participate to take advantage of her perfect signal. She will be willing to buy (sell) when the price is smaller (greater) than her asset value. When the price equal her asset value, she is indifferent between buying and selling. This leads to the insiders' behavior stated in lemma. QED I now study the existence of non-revealing equilibria in my experimental environment. To do this, I determine the utility derived by an uninformed agent from trading at a non-revealing price and identify the situation in which it is smaller than the reserve utility. I consider the utility derived by a risk neutral uninformed trader i with utility function of the form U i (x)=x. This is without loss of generality as when a lottery is rejected by a risk neutral agent, no risk averse agent will accept it.
Suppose that P is a non-revealing transaction price belonging to the set {3,4,5,6,7} and that all insiders trade in the same direction following the lemma.
Assume that all uninformed agents are trading in the same direction. If they sell, "+1" traders get the utility ½[0/8*(P-3)]+½(P-9). In this expression, ½ refers to the ex-ante probability that the common value V is 2 or 8, 0/8 is the probability that the sell order is executed (when V=2, as the 8 traders are selling this probability is 0). When V=8, the four insiders buy and the four uninformed traders sell, thus the probability that a sell order is executed equals 1. If they sell, "-1" traders get the utility ½[0/8*(P-1)]+½(P-7). For these utilities to be positive, P should at least be greater than 7 which is impossible. If they buy, "+1" traders get the utility ½(3-P)+½[0/8*(9-P)] and "-1" traders get the utility ½(1-P)+½[0/8*(7-P)]. For these utilities to be positive, P should at least be smaller than 3 which is impossible.
Assume that only the "+1" uninformed agents are trading. If they sell, they get the utility: ½[0/6*(P-3)]+½(P-9). For this utility to be positive, P should be greater than 9 which is impossible. If they buy, they get the utility: ½(3-P)+½[0/6*(9-P)]. For this utility to be positive, P should be smaller than 3 which is impossible.
Assume that only the "-1" uninformed agents are trading. If they sell, they get the utility: ½[0/6*(P-1)]+½(P-7). For this utility to be positive, P should be greater than 7 which is impossible. If they buy, they get the utility: ½(1-P)+½[0/6*(7-P)]. For this utility to be positive, P should be smaller than 1 which is impossible.
Assume that the two uninformed agents' type are trading in opposite directions. Consider that "+1" traders sell and "-1" traders buy. "+1" traders get the utility ½[2/6*(P-3)]+½(P-9). For this utility to be positive, P should at least be greater than 7 which is impossible. Consider that "+1" traders buy and "-1" traders sell.
"+1" traders get the utility ½(3-P)+½[2/6*(9-P)] which is positive when P equals 3 or 4. "-1" traders get the utility ½[2/6*(P-1)+½(P-7) which is positive when P equals 6 or 7. Thus there is no price in the set {3,4,5,6,7} where the two types of uninformed agents are trading.
Overall, there is no non-revealing equilibrium with P belonging to {3,4,5,6,7} and all insiders trading in the same direction.
Suppose that P=3 is a non-revealing transaction price (the same reasoning applies when P=7). Following the lemma, consider that "+1" insiders buy and "-1" insiders sell when V=2 and that all insiders buy when V=8.
Assume that all uninformed agents are trading in the same direction. If they sell, "+1" traders get the utility ½[2/6*(3-3)]+½(3-9)=-3. Thus "+1" traders will refuse to trade contradicting the initial assumption. If they buy, "-1" traders get the utility ½[2/6*(1-3)]+½[0/8*(7-3)]=-1/3. Thus "-1" traders will refuse to trade contradicting the initial assumption.
Assume that the two uninformed agents' type are trading in opposite directions. Consider that "+1" traders sell and "-1" traders buy. "+1" traders get the utility ½(3-3)+½(3-9)=-3. Thus "+1" traders will refuse to trade contradicting the initial assumption. Consider that "+1" traders buy and "-1" traders sell. "-1" traders get the utility ½(3-1)+½(3-7)=-1. Thus "-1" traders will refuse to trade contradicting the initial assumption.
Assume that only "+1" uninformed agents are trading on the selling side. They get the utility ½[2/4*(3-3)]+½(3-9)=-3. Thus "+1" traders will refuse to trade contradicting the initial assumption.
Assume that only "-1" uninformed agents are trading on the buying side. They get the utility ½[2/4*(1-3)]+½[0/6*(7-3)]=-1/2. Thus "-1" traders will refuse to trade contradicting the initial assumption.
Assume that only "+1" uninformed agents are trading on the buying side. They get the utility ½[2/4*(3-3)]+½[0/6*(9-3)]=0. As this utility is null, I can consider that "+1" traders will refuse to trade contradicting the initial assumption.
Assume that only "-1" uninformed agents are trading on the selling side. They get the utility ½[2/4*(3-1)]+½(3-7)=-3/2. Thus "-1" traders will refuse to trade contradicting the initial assumption.
Overall, there is no non-revealing equilibrium with P equal to 3 (resp. 7) and insiders trading in opposite direction when V=2 (resp. 8).
Suppose that P=2 is a non-revealing transaction price (the same reasoning applies when P=8). Following the lemma, if V=2, "+1" insiders are buying and "-1" insiders are selling. If V=8, all insiders are buying.
Assume that all uninformed agents are trading in the same direction. If they sell, "+1" traders get the utility ½[2/6*(2-3)]+½(2-9)=-11/3. Thus "+1" traders will refuse to trade contradicting the initial assumption. If they buy, "-1" traders get the utility ½[2/6*(1-2)]+½[0/8*(7-2)]=-2/12. Thus "-1" traders will refuse to trade contradicting the initial assumption.
Assume that the two uninformed agents' type are trading in opposite directions. Consider that "+1" traders sell and "-1" traders buy. "+1" traders get the utility ½(2-3)+½(2-9)=-2. Thus "+1" traders will refuse to trade contradicting the initial assumption. Consider that "+1" traders buy and "-1" traders sell. "-1" traders get the utility ½(2-1)+½(2-7)=-2. Thus "-1" traders will refuse to trade contradicting the initial assumption.
Hence, there is no non-revealing equilibrium with P equal 2 or 8 and all uninformed agents trading.
Assume that only "+1" uninformed agents are trading on the selling side. They get the utility ½[2/4*(2-3)]+½(2-9)=-15/4. Thus "+1" traders will refuse to trade contradicting the initial assumption.
Assume that only "-1" uninformed agents are trading on the buying side. They get the utility ½[2/4*(1-2)]+½[0/6*(7-2)]=-1/4. Thus "-1" traders will refuse to trade contradicting the initial assumption.
Assume that only "+1" uninformed agents are trading on the buying side. They get the utility ½[2/4*(3-2)]+½[0/6*(9-2)]=1/4. As this utility is positive, a non-revealing equilibrium exists in this case.
Assume that only "-1" uninformed agents are trading on the selling side. They get the utility ½[2/4*(2-1)]+½(2-7)=-9/4. Thus "-1" traders will refuse to trade contradicting the initial assumption.
Overall, two non-revealing equilibria exist. In the first non-revealing equilibrium, P=2 and the only uninformed agents that are trading are the "+1" agents (on the buying side). In the second non-revealing equilibrium, P=8 and the only uninformed agents that are trading are the "-1" agents (on the buying side).
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QED
